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Introduction
A significant number of empirical applications of contemporary competition modeling has proposed indicators of market structure that suffer from either limited comparability across European countries and over time (Bolt and Humphrey, 2010) .
The structural approach, that is concentration ratios capturing the structural features of a market, is used in models or interpreted in conjunction with other performance measures to explain the competitive behavior of a specific industry without sufficing stand-alone to extrapolate competitive conditions. Even changes in concentration can be deduced regarding market entries and exits, a feature widely used in U.S for antitrust purposes.
The next step of the literature is to build up a link between structural changes and bank performance, mainly on the grounds of the Relative Efficiency (RE) and the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP). Non-structural measures developed in response to potential endogeneity and deficiencies of structural models to quantify bank competition based upon the pricing conduct -the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach. Another case may be the degree of contestability in a bank market; few banks implement competitive pricing as price takers in order to discourage 'hit and run' behavior of new entries and thereby second their monopoly power.
Eschewing from conventional competition modeling, Heffernan (2002) tests for contestability and Cournot/Salop-Stiglitz behavior in UK banking industry by proposing a general linear model of competitive pricing of the important retail banking products: deposits, loans, credit cards and mortgages. There is also considerable attention in the literature to the so-called Boone indicator that measures competitive conditions insofar as they are expressed by efficiency dynamics. The most recent models coming to shed light on the cross-country comparability of alternative competition measures and incorporate the switch of banking income to not-interest bearing sources are those of Carbo et al. (2009) and Bolt and Humphrey (2010) , respectively. The econometric analysis applies an error-correction specification to distill competition measures from country-specific effects, and stochastic frontier methodology to provide rankings of banking sectors in terms of relative competitive measures of market structure. This paper addresses the key effects of market power as proxied by the Lerner index not only in its aggregate form but also with respect to key income sources. The contribution therefore is threefold: a) the sample is focusing on nine developed countries within the European union since the advent of Euro in order to particularly focus on Europe up until the crack of the financial crisis, b) the emphasis is placed on the measurement of marginal costs in order to abstain from potential bias triggered by traditional modelling in the literature and c) it is the first time that potential effects on market power are identified at the income level.
Literature review

Cross-country studies of competition testing
The most widely applied methodology that falls within the NEIO approach is that of Panzar and Rosse (1987) , identifying European samples classified in transition and developed economies along with other versions like EU-10, EU-15, European
Monetary Union (EMU), Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) or other sub-regions.
Monopolistic competition is quite common in large European samples in Staikouras
and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006) , in the EU-15 group according to Casu and Girardone (2006) and in the developing (EU-12) region in the run up to the adoption of Euro (Weill, 2004) . Delis et al. (2008) similarly found the PR statistic between 0 and 1 for Greece, Latvia and Spain during the period [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] 2 .
The Bresnahan-Lau methodology has met a handful of cross-country applications relatively to the popularity of PR statistic. In particular, an international sample is studied by Shaffer (2001) covering North America, Europe and Asia during the period 1979-1991. They provide evidence over contestability or, alternatively, Cournot-like oligopoly in Belgium, Denmark, France, Japan and US whereas competitive structures are evident in Canada, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and
Finland. Neven and Röller (1999) argued about colluding behavior in the banking markets of Belgium, France, Spain, Germany, Denmark and UK over the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] , albeit with a considerable diminishing trend over time. Last, Delis et al.
(2008) applied additional dynamic error-correction specifications along the lines of Steen and Salvanes (1999) and concluded about potential bias of static models when they fail to capture short-run dynamics. Indeed, monopolistic competition is generally evident but in dynamic models the market power is relatively higher. Bikker (2003) report on a European sample within the period 1987-1997 with respect to deposits and lending markets. Especially, the deposit markets of the entire European region as well as those of Germany and Spain operate under monopolistic competition, while at the same time the same holds for the lending markets of Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK.
2 On the contrary, Molyneux et al. (1994) found monopoly conditions in Italy during the sub-period 1987-1989. The Lerner index has been widely applied in the banking literature especially investigating correlations of the degree of competition with other contemporary competitive isssues. Hence, it is rarely juxtaposed to the aforementioned methodologies so as to compare and thereby challenge the robust persistence of market power levels. Exception to this pattern is the study of Turk Ariss ( Vennet, 2008) . The analysis also reports monopolistic tendency when banks enjoy more capital and engage in lending due to the integration of cost-effective risk management techniques. Khiabani and Hamidisahneh (2012) 
Potential effects on competition
Methodology
The underlying paper estimates the price mark-up over marginal cost combining the estimation of average prices and marginal costs at the bank level. The
where TC: total costs, Q: total assets, W1: price of labour (personnel expenses over total assets), W2: price of physical capital (other operating expenses over fixed assets), Z1: fixed assets deflated by total equity, Z2: Off-balance sheet activities (noninterest operating income) deflated by total equity and T: time trend. I introduce fixed effects to account for different bank specificities and run model 1 separately for each banking market to reflect different technologies in the region. I also employ time dummies to interact with the deterministic kernel in order to capture time-varying and non-neutral technological progress in the banking sector. Homogeneity of degree one in input prices (Σγ k =1) and symmetry conditions in all quadratic terms are imposed in model 1.
When it comes to the estimation of the Lerner index, I extrapolate the marginal costs by running the following model, which is schematically the partial derivative of total costs with respect to total assets (see Berger et al. 2009 ):
It is then possible to construct the Lerner index (L) with respect to specific bank activities before delving into the analysis of competition determinants.
According to the following structural model,
where P denotes the average revenue of banks estimated by total income over total assets and MC the marginal cost derived through model 2. Their subscripts signify the use of Lerner index as the only proxy of market power at the bank level over time.
The following model 4 encompasses the conditioning of market power to various information sets that comprise some key effects that have been under scrutiny in the literature and other variables depicting conditions in the banking industry, institutional and macroeconomic environment. Therefore, I maintain the structure of four specifications in models 4 and 5 in order to draw upon the changes of significance in the key coefficients employed. 
For the SUR to be properly applied, the models of every income-specific Lerner index should have exactly the same size but different information set.
Otherwise, the estimation falls into equation-by-equation OLS. As for the employed data, the selection of variables stems from the ability of the banking literature to pin down a theory of the interconnection amongst them and to verify it empirically. Thus, the analysis picks up the factors (as well as those of the baseline model) that determine the highest possible explanatory power for the whole sample before it comes to repeat the regressions for every bank type. I also use bootstrapping methodology (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010) to reduce the inference bias induced by group-wise heteroskedasticity along with the within-panel correlation of standard error across models 6 . In some cases (commercial, other banks) where standard errors could not be computed by bootstrapping due to limited observations, I opt to exclude time effects from the analysis. I winsorise all dependent variables at 5% of each distribution tail in order to alleviate skewness persistence.
Competition determinants
Size is introduced in the form of log of total assets as a control variable in order to allow for the heterogeneous European sample that is associated with either relative market power or scale economies. I opt to plug in the model a quadratic term to verify whether it is the case of non-linear relationship between size and competition. The analysis tests the SCP paradigm with the significance of HerfindahlHirschman index (concentration), which is the sum of the squared market shares of all banks operating in a country. Taking into account Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) , the effect of concentration may be different if expressed in terms of total deposits and loans. On the contrary to the use of aggregated information for the concentration proxy, the estimation of HHI stems from the sample data in order to examine how the endogenous synthesis of market shares may constitute an exogenous force towards 6 The Breusch-Pagan test is always rejecting the null hypothesis of no correlated residuals. Though not included for space considerations, they are available upon request.
market power. However, data from non-consolidated accounts by no means exclude large banks that otherwise would depict larger-than-national regions, since they comprise information of at least a part of banks' operations disaggregated at national level.
Market share reflects the ratio of a bank's total assets over those of a national banking industry. It is also expressed in terms of total deposits and loans to specify the channel, through which the efficiency hypothesis may hold. However, its statistical significance should be interpreted in conjunction with that of efficiency and concentration in order to give credit to the power of alternative competition theories.
I use the first order lag of loan impairment charges over average gross loans as a proxy of credit risk abstaining from the traditional non-performing loans over gross loans since it lacks considerable amount of observations from 2002 and onwards.
Moreover, the former is a direct measure of loan losses as it is deducted at the end of the year from profits and, hence, is taken into account when it comes to price bank products the year after; the latter is more obscure when it comprises doubtful loans that may or may not end up nonperforming.
I employ cost-to-income ratio as a direct measure of operational performance that may be attributed to superior management or production technologies. The RE hypothesis assumes that banks of higher efficiency engage in competitive pricing in order to grasp greater market shares and lead eventually to high market concentration.
The degree of income diversification of bank portfolios is indicated by the proxy of off-balance sheet activities over total assets. It is ambiguous, however, whether the sign of effect is going to be positive or negative since banks willing to engage in other than traditional loan and deposit services may have a different strategic pricing contingent on the bank type, region, economic cycle, between others.
Total equity as a percentage of total assets (capital) to account of further size effects on the Lerner index of other non-interest income. The intuition here is that banks of greater size or high capital buffers are willing to expand non-traditional banking. Liquidity, proxied by the amount of liquid assets over customer deposits and short term funding, is an important driver in the models of interest-bearing Lerner indexes so as to quantify the correlation of pricing conduct with the ability of banks to facilitate a potential bank run.
Bank claims on the private sector over GDP proxy the elasticity of aggregate demand so as to verify whether the dependence on bank financing may be associated with benefits on the real economy or loan losses and bank instability. Apart from the effect of real GDP growth (cyclicality) capturing the procyclical or countercyclical effect of market expansion on market power, the use of the real GDP per capita and inflation to see whether it is the case of population (GDPPC) or price effect Other effects already tested in the literature, namely regulation and supervision, liquidity risk, equity capital, implicit interest payments or degree of risk aversion turn out insignificant without affecting the regression output whatsoever. I end up with a parsimonious information set omitting additional bank-specific and institutional variables that lack sufficient statistical information during the underlying period.
Data
The sample Supposing that irrational behaviour takes the form of competitive market in the eyes of customers, the results are close to the competition efficiency scores estimated by Bolt and Humphrey (2010) . In addition, the negative values in the last four columns, bank-specific indexes are supposed to constitute not a straightforward metric of income-specific market power but, alternatively, the relative contribution of each L i to the construction of the Lerner index; from a different perspective, the analysis provides evidence of the specific products that sufficiently 'reimburse' the marginal cost. Ideally, the overall index (L) should be the sum of the 4 sub-indexes, although some sources are excluded from the analysis as unavailable and, thus, the lack of data does not permit us to delineate rankings of relative market power at income level, but rather to investigate its possible effects ( 6 ).
Results
Non-linearities are present through the quadratic term of asset size, which remains at the same levels significant with negative sign; positive correlation does exist at least up to a certain level of the asset size of savings and 'other' banks, reminiscent of contestable conduct or economies of scale that turn it negative; cooperative banks, however, experience a negative pattern only in lower values of total assets due to the homogenous German industry of equally sized institutions. Contrarily opposed to the relative market power hypothesis, market share performs insignificant and negative coefficient with a positive indication traced in 'other' banks and cooperative banks. However, a more competitive pricing seems a common practice for commercial banks and for cooperative banks of relatively low market share. Efficiency structure hypothesis is verified by the negative and significant coefficient of cost-to-income ratio at the 1% level along the lines of Koetter et al. (2012) , who concluded the same for US banks. In fact, the strategic option of banks to exploit lower costs in favour of their customers either in the form of lower loan rates or higher deposit rates (Vennet, 2002) . Furthermore, credit risk motivates commercial and cooperative banks to apply higher profit margins, a strategy which is contradistinction with that of 'other' banks. In cases where the element of increased market share is not verified empirically as it is assumed by the theory, banks with lower costs have relatively higher margins along the lines of pure efficiency hypothesis. The effect of GDP growth remains insignificant in all but one specification, while its positive sign implies procyclical force for savings banks rather than the opposing countercyclical practice of commercial banks. Thus in times of economic expansion, the former enjoys relatively higher margins exacerbating thereby the economic conditions down the road either seconding bubbles or deepening the recession spiral. However, the significance is not robust and, thus, any remark should be drawn with caution. Moreover, the elasticity of aggregate demand, which is a bank-oriented form of firm financing, is significant up to 1% level in the aggregate as well as in the case of commercial and cooperative banks. The negative effect means that as more credit is demanded and granted to the private sector, banks tend to narrow down profit margins.
After accounting of all fixed effects in European banking, the negative effect of lending-facilitating laws is considerably significant on market power and in particular for cooperative and commercial banking. Regulatory and supervisory policies are expressed in the degree of law stringency acting preventively against monopolistic practices and in favour of borrowers and lenders in order to facilitate access to credit.
[ Insert table 6 Table 7 exhibits the lowest fit of the 830 observations, as R-squared ranges between 62.7% and 68.4%. The fact that banks specialized in lending/deposit-taking enjoy higher margins due to long-lasting relationships may justify the low explanatory power of the commercial modeling (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berlin and Mester, 1999) . Furthermore, asset size seems to be highly significant for L-otherint and Lothernint models with a negative bearing while it turns negative for L-loans. In other words, as banks increase their size, prices on other interest and non-interest products (loans) are plummeting (increasing). Non-linearities exist in all cases but L-otherint;
as banks are getting bigger in asset size they tend to offer lower other interest and non-interest profit margins and higher loan rates. After a certain point, higher bank size goes the other way around making banks follow the exactly opposite trend.
[ Insert table 7 [ Insert table 8 here] In addition, banks with greater market share behave competitively when they impose prices on other interest income, fees and commissions. Relative market power is scantily existent in the L-loans model having a negative (positive) bearing in the deposit (loan) market. It is also the case of efficient structure hypothesis for L-loans as the pertinent coefficient is negative at 1% level of significance with considerable credit losses making also banks reluctant to succumb to high prices on loans.
According to it, amid competitive conditions in the market more efficient banks are likely to survive by means of eliciting greater market share from less efficient institutions (Demsetz, 1973) .
The share of OBS to total assets has a considerably positive impact on L-fees and L-otherint corroborating the tendency of well-diversified banks to impose high margins. Bank capital demonstrates, as expected, a positive sign suggesting that a higher degree of risk aversion (high capital ratio) is transmuted to higher margin on OBS activities to make up for the inherent systematic risk 7 . What is more, the degree of liquidity of bank assets turns out to have a negative effect on L-otherint, as opposed to the case of more liquid commercial banks that prefer lower prices on loans.
Private credit is also an important factor for L-fees with a negative sign without losing significance when there is disaggregation of concentration and market share or the non-linear term of asset size. Moreover, the indication that the price effect of economic growth as well as proactive legal initiatives in favour of consumer protection operates procyclically towards monopolistic practices in fee and other interest income, respectively.
[Insert table 9 here] Next, the regression output for savings banks (table 9) Cost efficiency along with credit risk is negatively interconnected with Lloans at 1% level compatible with the practice of banks to exercise market power on the grounds of reducing costs. Thus, there is no indication of 'quit life' hypothesis, according to which banks not vulnerable to intense competition, managers by no means seek to maximise profits through an everlasting cost reduction (Berger and Hannan, 1998; Delis and Tsionas, 2009 ). Rather pure efficiency hypothesis comes into play, which sets out the ability of efficient banks to engage in monopolistic pricing without intending to higher market shares. In addition, diversified portfolios make banks feel safer to charge higher margins on OBS activities offsetting at least in part the positive effect of loan losses on competitive pricing of loans.
Moreover, banks with high share of liquid assets engage in competitive pricing on loans and monopolistic conduct on other interest-bearing activities;
however, that is in contrast with the pattern observed in cooperative banks. As cooperative banks operate in a decentralised system of rather national as well as regional outreach, liquid assets enable banks to enhance long-standing relationships through cheaper loans and more expensive prices on trading and investment securities. That may also be conducive from the opportunity cost that banks are bound to bear as a result of their obligation to withhold liquid reserves. Thus, higher loan prices compensates for potentially higher interest rates being available in the financial markets (Hawtrey and Liand, 2008) . It is intuitively relevant the argument of Lakonishok et al (1992) , according to which larger banks with low liquid assets share demonstrate a herding behaviour in excessive risk-taking in other (interest) income sources by charging higher profit margins.
More private credit and legal stringency are persistently significant and negatively related to L-othernint and L-otherint, respectively. As inflation and GDP per capita are insignificant I conclude that there pricing conduct is not contingent on different stages of economic development.
The remaining banking sector (table 10) Legal stringency maintains its preemptive repercussion against market monopoly.
Conclusion
The advent of Euro and the concomitant formulation of a single market brought about considerable challenges and opportunities for the whole banking industry. The analysis of the market power in 9 developed markets suggests imperfect competition but not at levels that signify collusive tendency. However, the markets of Denmark and Sweden seem to experience more than 33% of price mark-up over I endorse also the necessity for antitrust policies that stand up against collusive practices of concentrated markets, as savings (commercial) banks implement higher other interest income (fees). With concentrated loans markets, market power is also evident in 'other' and commercial banks while the same holds for the latter in deposits markets. Even so, cooperative ('other') banks enjoy higher profit margins on loans (other interest products) if the loans (deposits) market is considerably concentrated. Likewise, banks with high market shares tend to behave competitively opposing to the operation of 'other' banks, which appear to entertain higher fees due to their high market share in the deposits market. Hence, insignificance (except for 'other' banks) of the relative market power hypothesis suggests that policy makers should take account of certain banks enjoying high margins in specific product categories amid collusive practices across either loans or deposits markets.
In addition, the efficient operation turns out significant in European banking as low costs induce banks to charge lower interest rates on loans or higher deposit rates. However, that gives no credit to the inherent impetus of banks for higher market shares in order to exploit their power, with the exception of 'other' banks and in high levels of market share of cooperative banks. In contrast, commercial, cooperative with higher market shares impose low fees, while cooperative and savings banks utilise low other interest charges. Cost economies, therefore, constitute an indispensable catalyst of convergence towards competitive prices while incentives in favour of income diversification induce banks (cooperative, commercial, 'other) for higher fees and others (cooperative, commercial) for high other non-interest rates.
More capitalised banks (cooperative, savings) also tend to surrender to high prices of other non-interest bearing activities, an issue which is directly linked to capital requirements given that they constitute a considerable part of a bank's portfolio. Furthermore, I signify the extension of Basel III in incorporating liquidity requirements towards stable institutions that provide liquidity to market participants effectively and manage payment transactions across different regions. Along the lines, more liquid cooperative (commercial) banks offer other interest products (cheap loans) at low prices although savings banks tend also to counterbalance the opportunity cost of liquid assets through higher non-interest rates.
Moreover, the need of additional requirements on a countercyclical basis exists only for savings given that commercial banks react contrarily to the business cycle. The latter, however, may imply poor monitoring and screening practices as well as (limited) securitisation of low 'quality'. In addition, in economies of high GDP per capita and inflation cooperative banks tend to charge higher other interest prices to make up for possible losses on fixed loan rates. Hence, there is room for further institutional reforming especially in the cases of 'other' banks, which seem to exploit higher elasticity of aggregate demand and impose higher fees. L1=Lerner with respect to income on loans; L2=Lerner index with respect to other interest income; L3=Lerner index with respect to fees and commissions; L4=Lerner index with respect to other non-interest income. All estimates are expressed in average terms per industry sector with the last row estimating the averages of the 9-country sample. The percentage in the parentheses highlights the weights of income sources on banks' portfolio. (1): standard OLS regression with standard errors clustered at the bank level using country and time fixed effects to allow for unobserved heterogeneity; Column (2): Fixed effects model estimation with clustered standard error at the bank level along with probability country weights. In so doing, I apply the inverse of the number of banks operating within a national banking sector for cases where sample is overrepresented by some countries (e.g. Germany); Column (3): Fixed effects model estimation with clustered standard error at the bank level with time fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses while asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 8 . (commercial, cooperative, savings, other) with clustered standard errors at the bank level utilising country and time fixed effects to allow for unobserved heterogeneity. The second column per bank type is the expansion of the information set to comprise the quadratic term of asset size as well as the concentration and market share with respect to deposits and loans markets. Standard errors are in parentheses while asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 9 . results of commercial banks through two Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, the first one including total assets, market share and concentration apart from other controls and country fixed effects and the other analyzing the effect of total assets squared, concentration and market share with respect to deposits and loans. I opt to exclude time fixed effects since otherwise standard errors could not be estimated. The estimation allows for correlation among errors across the four models within each bank as well as heteroskedasticity by means of bootstrapping. The four models have as independent variables Lerner indexes specific to four distinctive sources of bank income: Loans, other interest income, fees/commissions and other non-interest income. T-statistic is reported below each coefficient while asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. results of cooperative banks through two Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, the first one including total assets, market share and concentration apart from other controls and country/time fixed effects and the other analysing the effect of total assets squared, concentration and market share with respect to deposits and loans. The estimation allows for correlation among errors across the four models within each bank as well as heteroskedasticity by means of bootstrapping. The four models have as independent variables Lerner indexes specific to four distinctive sources of bank income: Loans, other interest income, fees/commissions and other non-interest income. Tstatistic is reported below each coefficient while asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. results of savings banks through two Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, the first one including total assets, market share and concentration apart from other controls and country/time fixed effects and the other analysing the effect of total assets squared, concentration and market share with respect to deposits and loans. The estimation allows for correlation among errors across the four models within each bank as well as heteroskedasticity by means of bootstrapping. The four models have as independent variables Lerner indexes specific to four distinctive sources of bank income: Loans, other interest income, fees/commissions and other noninterest income. The information sets of the models are equally sized but not equivalent whatsoever; otherwise I would fall into the standard case of equation-by-equation OLS. T-statistic is reported below each coefficient while asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. results of 'other' banks through two Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, the first one including total assets, market share and concentration apart from other controls and country fixed effects and the other analyzing the effect of total assets squared, concentration and market share with respect to deposits and loans. I opt to exclude time fixed effects since otherwise standard errors could not be estimated. The estimation allows for correlation among errors across the four models within each bank as well as heteroskedasticity by means of bootstrapping. The four models have as independent variables Lerner indexes specific to four distinctive sources of bank income: Loans, other interest income, fees/commissions and other non-interest income. T-statistic is reported below each coefficient while asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
